I looked forward to reading your posts, but I haven’t seen any new ones for a while.

Hope all is well,

EA

Thanks for your reply. I’ll reply as soon as I get a chance.

Best,

EA

I am not denying the distinction between strong conceivability and weak conceivability. It is a hasty move to take my argument as simply adducing the latter as justification for the former. Of course, all sorts of absurdities follow via parity of reasoning if my argument does this, but the express purpose of my argument is to show that the notion of a PB, when unpacked, opens up a myriad of justificatory options for belief in the possibility of a PB, because that PB is the Christian God. These options are not available to the ‘would be’ believer in the possibility of GC, the knowno, and H/P. My argument attempts to explicate the notion of a PB under the pretense of perfect-being theology. According to the modal argument (and most other arguments in philosophy of religion) the Christian God is a PB—a bundle of perfections or maximally great attributes. It seems that the modal property of necessary existence is a good candidate for inclusion among these perfections (as PVI argues).

I do not think that arguments from natural theology and religious experience establish this modal property (insofar as they establish anything). However, if I accept that the Christian God is a PB, it is hard to see how justification for the actual existence of this is not transitive to considerations of possible existence, and therefore necessary existence. Obviously, you may just deny that the Christian God is a PB and that Anselm’s conceptual project to establish the former (prior to any natural theology) is successful. If so, then there is not much progress ahead.

Nevertheless, why am I precluded from any of the options in ‘r1…r9’ in an attempt to justify belief in the possibility of a PB? If my conception of a PB as a bundle of perfections is, in some part, conceptually prior to any argument for the actual existence of the Christian God (and therefore a PB), then it is not incumbent upon me to show that arguments for actual existence must directly argue for the modal property of necessary existence. Yet it I cannot see how arguments for actual existence do not directly help justify necessary existence if the object of the argument thought to be metaphysically necessary from the outset—which is precisely the case under the lights of perfect-being theology.

Again, if I can weakly conceive that an Anselmian PB is possible, it seems I have opened the door to justification options (‘r1…r9’) that afford me a much better epistemic stance than the analogies of weak conception that you have offered.

How this fits into the literature on modal epistemology (that I am familiar with at least) is not clear to me. Although I suspect that garden-variety examples of weak-conceivability are simply not analogous to the conceivability under consideration here. And of course, acceptance of perfect-being theology, though not without its reason, is problematic.

By way of autobiography, I think the modal ontological argument does not work (for other reasons than we have discussed). Nor am I a proponent of perfect-being theology. I am just exploring possible options for the perfect-being adherent that finds a PB that has necessary existence as a perfection to be intuitively attractive, and wants a response to PVI’s criticisms.

I appreciate your patience and consideration,

Regards,

ET (or Evan, if you are not in the movie mood)

I’ll get back with a fuller reply when I’m able to come up for air, but let me make a quick reply for now. I worry that you’re not picking up on the weak conceivability/strong conceivabliity distinction, and why weak conceivability is not sufficient evidence for possibility.

As far as I can tell, you seem to think that

1) I fail to see that a PB is (broadly) logically impossible.

entails or prima facie justifies

2) I see that a PB is (broadly) logically possible.

Otherwise, I can’t see why you would think that my granting (1) entails, or otherwise provides sufficient evidence for, (2). But, to repeat, (1) just isn’t sufficient evidence for (2). If it were, then by parity of reasoning, we should say the same thing about the possible existence of Knowno, the possible truth and falisity of GC (which would entail that CG is only contingently true(!)), the possible distinctness of Hesperus and Phospherus, the possible distinctness of water and H20, etc. So by reductio, (1)-type propositions aren’t sufficient evidence for (2)-type propositions.

Also, I see that you want to use the Bible and religious experience, etc., as evidence for a PB. That way, you can say that you can infer, from that claim and the claim that necessary existence is a perfection, the modal property of necessary existence from the Bible and religious experience, without having to be directly aware of this modal property. But I think you would be hard pressed to get an Anselmian PB from the Bible or from religious experience. The same goes for other arguments from natural theology: I worry that there are arguments that are both (i) sound, and (ii) have the implication that God is a PB. But in any case, as I alluded to a couple of posts ago, if you had a case for such a god from other arguments from natural theology, then the modal ontological argument is superfluous if your goal is to provide independent evidence for God’s existence.

That’s how I see it at the moment anyway. Perhaps I’m mistaken?

Best,

EA

Thanks,

ET

1) A perfect being is possible.

2) Necessary existence is a perfection.

3) A perfect being necessarily exists. [From 1, 2]

4) There are reasons r1…r9 for belief in the actual existence of the Christian God.

5) The Christian God is a perfect being.

6) The Christian God necessarily exists. [From 2, 3, 5]

7) There are reasons r1…r9 for belief in the necessary existence of the Christian God. [From 3, 4, 5, 6]

Therefore, there are reasons r1…r9 for belief in the necessary existence of a perfect being. [From 4, 5, 7]

(1)-(3) is simply van Inwagen’s modal argument. (1) is of course susceptible to both the argument from weak-conceivability and the knowno argument, but I think (2)-(8) deflate the force of those objections. If not, so much the worse for (1) and the rest of my argument.

Van Inwagen brings this partially to bear in the text, but (2) is in step with Anselm’s project, and is as convincing as many of the other perfections delineated in perfect-being theology. If we accept the project—as it seems we should if we write in terms of a “perfect being—(2) is not objectionable.

The same qualifiers I gave for (1) apply for (3).

(4) seems obvious, but my use of “r1…r9” need explaining. By “reasons”, I am casting a very wide net. I am referring to the entire project of natural theology, arguments from religious (Christian, in this case) experience, and even arguments that work to justify Christian theism without the evidential constraints (e.g., Reformed Epistemology). If my argument is to proceed there must be something in “r1…r9” such that if the Christian theist adduces one of the options, she is in a more favorable epistemic position than if she adduces none of the options. I suspect you accept this as I do (regardless of our religious convictions, or lack thereof), so I will argue given that assumption.

While I think it is debatable on several grounds, most of analytic philosophy of religion (as it relates to Christianity) accepts (5) as a starting point, in keeping with Anselm’s project. I would beg the question if I use the former as evidence for truth of (5), but it is out of the scope of this argument to weigh and alternate views of the Christian God. Most likely, those who are interested in (1)-(8) assume its truth; I will leave it at that.

(6) follows from (3) and (5).

As for (7), obviously, I have admitted all of the evidence (r1…r9) for the actual existence of the Christian God as fair game in consideration of the necessary existence of the same being.

(8) follows from (4)-(7). If you are willing to concede that a PB is weakly conceivable, it is seems plausible that this conception points at a being that has necessary existence as one of its perfections. If this same PB is the Christian God—which those defending the ontological argument and criticizing it both seem to accept—then reasons admitted for the actual existence of the Christian God must count for the necessary existence of a PB. I think this move defeats the knowno objection by making available a myriad of reasons for belief in the necessary existence of a PB that are simply not available for belief in a knowno. This brings us back to my epistemic point from before, which you do not find objectionable.

In sum, I think it is plausible to include necessary existence into the bundle of perfections (or maximal attributes) that comprises a PB in the above argument. If this is true, arguments for the actual existence of the Christian God are pointing at the same being to which your weak conceivability points. Hence, these arguments serve to justify the claim of necessary existence since the being to which they point has the perfection of necessary existence.

Of course, there is still the question whether the purported success of (1)-(8) raises the conceivability of a PB from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’. Or, to put it in your terms, whether my conceiving a PB is now a ‘low-flying thought experiment’ by virtue of all the options available to you in r1…r9. I think this question hinges on what you think of the potency of the arguments available for the actual existence of the Christian God. And even if the strongest argument that ties religious experience to perception works, perhaps it is still disanalogous to the strong inductive evidence you have in virtue of watching other people surf, or others cars with red paint. Even if this is the case, or if you find little plausibility in any argument for the actual existence of a Christian God (and hence, a PB), it is at least the case that belief in a PB is not in the same epistemic position as belief in a knowno. Whether this calls for a gradation in weak conceivability and strong conceivability, or a reformulation of the knowno objection, I am not sure.

At the least, I am looking to show that weakly conceiving of a PB with necessary existence as a perfection opens up the door for (4)-(8) where arguments for the actual existence of the Christian God count as arguments for the necessary existence of a PB, seeing as the Christian God is a PB.

Again, thanks for the continued interaction. I do hope this semester is not closing in on you too violently. Have an excellent day.

Regards,

ET

Please take your time. It’s end-of-the-quarter madness for me at the moment.

Best,

EA

I will do my best to post a response tomorrow. Is there a possible world in which life does not get in the way of modal epistemology? Now that is a world I wish was actual. Thank you for your interaction thus far.

Regards,

ET